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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLEO R. POWELL,

]

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

]) Case No. 139.
]

DICK E. BASTIAN, DEE V. SHARP,
dba SHARP REALTY, and Provo
Branch PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS "
§ LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Federally
Chartered Savings and Loan
'
Association,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This action in equity and law is brought on
appeal from the Fourth District Court for Utah
County by the plaintiff-appellant, Mrs. Cleo R.
Powell, formerly a resident and for seventeen years
purchaser of a home in Orem, Utah. The Amended
Complaint alleges the plaintiff suffered equitable
and legal damages in a transaction involving the
sale of her Orem home. The trial without a jury
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
was held Machine-generated
in October,OCR,
1974,
presided over by the
may contain errors.

Honorable J. Robert Bullock, District Judge.
The Amended Complaint was filed on the 9th
day of August, 1973, showing Cleo R. Powell and
Stephen R. Smoot, her Trustee in Bankruptcy, as
plaintiffs.

The Trustee was included as a

plaintiff because in the summer of 1972 Mrs.
Powell, having been deprived of her fair share
of the sale price of her Orem home, was forced
into bankruptcy for the discharge of approximately
$3,000.00 of judgments and other unsecured debts.
The contingency claim, represented by this case,
was revealed in the bankruptcy schedules. The
Trustee in Bankruptcy elected to join as a
plaintiff in the trial because of his interest
in maximization of Mrs. Powell's bankruptcy estate,
but said Trustee in Bankruptcy declined to join
in this appeal.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court issued its pretrial Order on
September 6, 1974, (R 85) and by the same instrument
disposed of.pretrial motions as follows:
(a) Plaintiff's Motion (R 50), that the court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hold, as a matter of law, that the deed of plaintiff's home to defendant Bastian together with
Bastian's option to plaintiff to sell or buy
back the home within three months at an increased
price of $2,000.00 constituted a security arrangement rather than a bona fide sale was denied (R 85).
(b) Plaintiff's Motion (R 80), to hold
defendant Bastian responsible to pay seller's
costs in the real estate closing was denied (R 85).
(c) Plaintiff's Motion (R 82), to require
defendant Sharp to make restitution to Mrs. Powell
of $1,230.00 real estate commission was denied (R 85).
(d) Plaintiff's Motion (R 46), to strike
paragraph

5 of defendant Prudential Federal Savings

§ Loan Association's answer was denied (R 85).
(e) Defendant Prudential's Motions (R 26 § 59),
to dismiss the case as to it was granted (R 84 § 91).
(f) Defendant Dee V. Sharp's Motion (R 24 § 52),
for summary judgment was denied (R 61 § 85).
(g) The trial court ruled (R 86) as a matter
of law that there could be no general, or exemplary
damages which had been claimed in the Amended
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Comolaint fR 691.

(h) The case was set for a non-jury trial on
October 3, 1974.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The facts are set forth in the Amended Complaint
(R63) and are substantially the same as the facts
found in the trial court's findings of fact (R 101),
and are as summarized below.
In June, 1970, plaintiff-appellant, Cleo R.
Powell (hereinafter called tfMrs. Powell") had been
faced with foreclosure of mortgages on her home
which a year previously had been appraised at
$24,500.00.

She sought a loan from defendant-

respondent Dick E. Bastian (hereinafter called
M

Bastiann) to stave off the impending foreclosures.

Instead of lending money, Bastian purchased the
home for $16,000.00 by deed (R 70) and he simultaneously
gave Mrs. Powell a written option (R 73) to buy the
home back or sell it and pay him $18,000.00 within
three months.
During the three-month option period, in order
to preserve as much of her equity as possible, Mrs.
Powell listed the home for quick sale at $21,500.00
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the Utah County Multiple Listing Program through

a neighbor who worked for Boles , n real estate
broker of American I;ork, 1 It
later, defendant-respondent iJtt v. Sharp (hereinafter called "Sharp"), al so a ] :i censed real
estate broker, asked Mi s, Powell ] i:c: • s i gi 1 an
Earnest Money Agreement to sell the home to third
parties fc r $20,500.00, or $1, 11)0,00 less than the
listing. Since time was running short for Mrs,
Powell to recover anything from her home, i n
despera/ti on she si gned tl le Agreement arid ad v i sed
broker Sharp that Bastian's signature would also
be necessary since she had deeded the property
to 1 lirn and had no I: exercised hei opti oi I to
repurchase the property.
Shortly after execution of the Earnest Money
Agreement on September in, iJ.u, n L1O± nig oi the
sale, of 'which Mrs, Powell was not notified, was
arranged a 1: the offices of defendant-respondent
Prudential Federal Savings § I oan Associate on,
Provo Branch (hereinafter called "'Prudential " ) .

Wi thout making i nqt li xy of Mi s I >OIA1 e ] 1 , ai id oi l Basti an
advice,, Prudential's closing agent, Mark Radmall,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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charged all sales costs, including $1,230.00 real

e s t a t e commission against Mrs. Powell'? equity.
The s-ilo p :v - ' • , - . .

•: •;"'.'{ " *>•

.

Powell's equity, wore forthwith d i s t r i b u t e
Prudential in accordance with the s e l l e r f s
statement prepared b> Prudentj a] "'""s agent Mark
Radmall (R 74), which statement was changed l a t e r
by Mark Radmall, also on Bastiaii's advice, by
forcing a balance, i low cliai gii ig $36- LOO a< Idl/ti onal
" i n t e r e s t " to Mrs, Powell as shown in Mark Radmall f s
'l\\t\vr

(1 ' I I .

Fol]Oi Pig the t r i a l , tlio c o u r t ' s dec roc II! II"! I
ordered jvu wment entered for Mis, Powell against
)Vi:.tLin is

f|,

ie anIOi nt sf $347.V> t*tr t i t l e

insurance I of $119.00) and t<txos (of $228.53)
improperly charged to Mrs, Powell's equity by
P.udeiitial at llii i iusiii)j «ni adi n e uf Bsst iaii.
No other r e l i e f prayed for by the p l a i n t i f f
\vrf-; granted by the t r i a l court.
KliUbr SUIHII'I UN MVl Ah
Since t h i s h a case m equity, and p a r t i c u l a r l y
since there i s si ibstanti a] ] ) no d:i spi ite among the
p a r t i e s as to the facts (though there i s substaiiti a]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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disagreement as to the law and how the law should
be appli ed to these fa cts), th:i s coi xrt :i s free on
this appeal to consider this enti re case in all
its aspects, including special damages of $4,342,50
in addition to $.'A\\?,'S

rpei la! iLimap.es .iwardnl by

the trial court. In addition, !•••-?. Towell prays
for general damages in the amount of $4,000,00
and exemplary damages also i n 1

^.^; I: of $< 1,000 (3(3,

to be allocated among the defendants-respondents
as i ii the wl se d:i screti on of tliii s coi irt seems just.
The damages thus prayed for are comparable to 1:1 le
treble damages commonly awarded by statute in
comparable -cases,
I
TIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FIND AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT MRS. POWELL'S DEED OF
HER HOME TO DEFENDANT RASTIAN FOR $16,000.00
TOGETHER WITH BASTIAN f S ABSOLUTE OPTION TO
MRS. POWELL TO SELL TO A THIRD PERSON OR
REPURCHASE WITHIN THREE MONTHS FOR $18,000.00
CONSTITUTED A SECURITY AGREEMENT, NOT A BONA
FIDE SALE AND PURCHASE.
The central issue in this case :i n i tis factual
context i s wliether or not the deed to M r s . Powell f s
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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home gi v ei l to Basti ai l ::: i i Ji u le J! "/ ] 970, • Ii: :)i $] 6,000

aiid Bastian f s simultaneous giving of the option
to Mt*i Powell to sell flif honn Hi1 rrpitiehasr it
within three months for $18,000.00, constituted a
bona fide purchase and sale of real property as
claimed hy Hhe deJ'ondants-respondents,, i
constituted a mortgage security agreement as
claimed bv plaintiff-appellant, Mrs. Powell. The
trial court refused to iuul the transaction ' •.
a security agreement and denied plaintiff's Motion
(V 'iHi llui! flu 11ansae! Mil slmmiM IK declared sinh,
The trial eourt thus lefused to follow this
court in ;;uoh Utah eases as Gibbons v s . Gibbons,
i,V) r.^J Itil), jue Q'Mh) where this court points
out in dicta that a deed may constitute a mortgage
when the following facts exist:
I

I Tie deed .is given in ..itisfaet ion ml
preexistent debt;

2

The grantor i s entitled to remain i n
possession without payment of rent;

3. The * rare or is ol ligti. t* I M V taxes;
I

T! le . > . .

*\ '

property after execute <i • « u,t u« eu.
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Mrs. Powell remained in possession of the house
without any obi igati on to pay rent to Bastian.
Indeed all of the foregoing conditions existed
in tlii s transaction. '
MCA*

leciutl), thr litnJi Siipiviw* Coin I ni Kjar

vs. Brimley, 27 IJ.2d 410, 497 P.2d 25 (197ZJ found
that th'Utfh the plaintiffs executed a warranty deed
to 1 he defendants, tl le transact:] on was a sea II :i ty
agreement and not a sale.

At. 497 P.2d 23, 25 this

court s I ates:
"The law may imply a promise to repay a debt
im3eFpaHicurar^circxjmstances of any case"7"
where it is clear that the lender had relied
on the property for his security, being
satisfied that he is protected by its high
value in relation to the amount loaned.f!
[Emphasis addedI.
The principal of law involved here is also
stated by tl i:i s coi u t i n Bybee_ysil_Stuai it, ] 89 P.2d
118 (1948) where at page 122 the following will be
found:
11

It is true, of course, that a warranty deed,
absolute in foxm is presumed to convey a fee
simple title, or at least whatever title the
grantor has. But where, as here, there is a
written agreement between the parties,
contemporaneous with the deed, which shows
the deed to have been given for security
Digitized bypurposes,
the Howard W. Hunter
Library,will
J. Reubenlook
Clark Law
theLaw
court
toSchool,
the BYU.
real
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

transaction, and treat it as a mortgage.
T^QTO"vsT~SKeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24.
TEe fact that by the terms of the contract,
Oni Stuart had the right to sell the land""
to" a third person, clearly indicates the
intention of the parties that title should
not passjbo the defendant/1 [Emphasis added].
In Khar vs. Brimley and Byvje Vb. .-cuctrt,
this o; irt ssid t!-r retention . t 1 V> rl;_M
j-,'t^'

person

V

^ ?{ ' *•-= tr;

M

*b

f

«<••?**•

r

the

• tliiw

i -Hi) indicates the intention or tne

parties tut f i' !•• should not pass to the defendant.
r

*

>

'

*

•>

of t V p a r t i e s t h a t titl.* suoui.. hot pa?^ to bastian
since, after i :\inr

1 ,,t

'

^~-» * s -- Powell remained

in possession cj<u :nnae.;:.•. < i

: -, <

;

, •;;*/

IV r :^ilo n t h a r 1 ; c 4 itc broker and *;<? property
* v ' ..:

*

'

J

• •!"

.:,

ITiis showc

both >': >. i owl i • • .. riastian intended
given V v^s. r \x !1 t:< Bastian would - <t convey
h t l e t<) HistKIII, ' "i1 <i'i' Mil1 option would preserve

t i t l e in Mrs. Powell so slit could s e l l fJie house
within three months for enough to pay Bastian 1 s
•1>J,( ui),mi 'JU-duy "profi r ,f .
The defendants clearly misconstrued the law
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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before

the trial court of the fact that in Mrs. Powell's
deposition she did not deny that she ffintended'f to
sign a deed to the property.

It should be obvious

that Mrs. Powell did sign the deed and for her to
deny that she had signed would be out-and-out
falsehood.
Where the defendants erred, the trial court
erred in adopting defendants1 argument is that
under the circumstances of this case, the Utah
courts have universally found that though a
plaintiff did not deny signing away his property,
when the grantee simultaneously gave a defeasance
of his title, the courts made the necessary inference
that the plaintiff did not intend to sign away title
to the property, and the defeasance of title showed
the grantee did not intend to take title.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD DEFENDANT
BASTIAN RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL SALES COSTS
SINCE (1) HE WAS PRESENT AT THE CLOSING;
(2) SIGNED THE CLOSING PAPERS AS SELLER;
(3) DEEDED THE PROPERTY DIRECTLY TO THE
THIRD PARTY PURCHASER; (4) ASSUMED ALL
SAI.ES EXPENSES BY THE TERMS OF HIS OPTION
AGREEMENT TO CONVEY ,fFREE AND CLEAR1f OF
ALL ENCUMBRANCES
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A-Fi-<vr ^Ac-Han had

Q-i cmed the Earnest Monev

Receipt submitted by Sharp, Bastian was notified
of and attended the real estate closing conducted
by Prudential's loan officer, Mark Radmall, at
its Provo Office. Mrs. Powell was not notified
of the closing and consequently did not attend.
Though Mrs. Powell was not present, through
collusion between Prudential's closing officer
Radmall, and Bastian, all of the closing costs
were charged against Mrs. Powell's equity.
In order to call the trial court's attention
to this particular oddity in the closing proceedings,
Mrs. Powell brought a Motion to Strike Paragraph
5 of Prudential's Answer to the Amended Complaint
(R 46) in which paragraph Prudential asserted it
had assessed all seller's costs against "the seller
Bastian". Actually it was not clear from the
seller's statement (R 74) prepared by Radmall and
signed by Bastian as seller on September 10, 1970,
who had actually paid the "seller's costs" including
taxes, title insurance, recording, real estate
commission, because there was no accounting to
show how Mrs. Powell's "equity" of $247.26 had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nvriva/1

«a +

Mr»t

ITTltll

TTiflTIV TrUTntliq

1 flt.&T

When

Mrs. Powell!s counsel demanded and received a
letter from Prudential's agent Mark Radmall dated
March 24, 1972 (R 74) was it perfectly clear that
n

seller Bastian" had not paid the seller's expenses,

but rather that lfseller's costs" had been charged
to the absent Mrs. Powell's "equity".
Yet all Prudential's false assertions in this
case that Bastian had been charged seller's costs
have been made many months after Prudential's
admissions in Radmall's letter (R 74).
In addition to attending the closing, Mr.
Bastian and his wife, Jessie Bastian, herself a
licensed real estate agent, signed the seller's
statement and the deed conveying title to Mrs.
Powell's home to the third party buyers, the
Ethingtons. Mrs. Powell never performed any act
as a seller except to sign the Earnest Money
Receipt, which Bastian also signed. Additionally,
Mr. and Mrs. Bastian signed the option in which
the Bastians explicitely promised to pay for title
insurance and to deliver marketable title from
themselves "free and clear of all encumbrances
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

excent those herein mentioned".

The Dortion of the

option fomi denominated "encumbrances" is filled
out with the following words, "All encumbrances
will be paid at this time [of reconveyance] or
the optionee has the right to assume the present
loan with Walker Bank, Provo, Utah, as part of
the purchase price."
Despite the foregoing, on advice of Bastian,
Prudential charged all the usual seller's costs
to Mrs. Powell, then repeatedly and doggedly,
throughout the pretrial period, Prudential insisted
(a) in its Answer to the Amended Complaint (R 46),
(b) Answer to Interrogatories (R 39), and (c) Memorandum in Opposition to Strike Paragraph 5 of its
Answer, that Bastian was the seller but Prudential
never explained why, if Bastian was the seller,
seller's costs were charged to Mrs. Powell, a stranger
to the closing.

Ill
DEFENDANT SHARP SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED
TO MAKE RESTITUTION OF HIS SALES COMMISSION
TO MRS. POWELL FOR HIS FAILURE TO FULFILL
HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO HER
The reasons that the trial court should have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR,
may contain
granted Mrs.
Powell's
Motion
toerrors.
require defendant

Sharp to make restitution to Mrs. Powell of the
$1,230.00 which was given to him by Prudential
from Mrs. Powell's funds at the real estate
closing are set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum
(R 82).

The arguments are summarized here.

Mrs. Powell alleged in her verified Complaint,
and the trial court found as fact (R 104) that
defendant Sharp was employed by Mrs. Powell as
her agent and the court found that Sharp owed her
a fiduciary duty. This finding places this aspect
of this case on all fours with Reese vs. Harper,
8 U.2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958) wherein this court
found that:
"It is incumbent upon [a real estate broker]
to apply his abilities and knowledge to the
advantage of the man he served; and to make
full disclosure of the fact which his principal
should know in transacting the business.
Failure to discharge such duty with reasonable
Hlligence^Jid care precludes his recovery f o ~
the services Tie purports to be rendering.
[Emphasis added].
With the trial court's finding that Sharp was
Mrs. Powell's agent and owed her a fiduciary duty,
the specific remedy in Reese vs. Harper, which
found that failure lfto discharge duty with

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reasonable diligence1f precluded broker Reese
from recovering for the services he purported
to perform, is the specific remedy "which should
be invoked here.

In case there be some thought

that Broker Sharp fulfilled his fiduciary duty
to Mrs. Powell, the court should read Sharp's
Affidavit (R 56) signed by Sharp and filed with
the court wherein paragraph 5, Sharp states:
11

. . . The undersigned had no responsibility
nor any opportunity for preparation of
closing documents, and specifically denies
any collusion or even knowledge on the part
of the undersigned as to the disposition of
the funds disbursed by the closing agent . . .
that he was uninformed as to the distribution
of funds between Bastian and Powell."
ff

6. The undersigned denies any responsibility
to act as a fiscal agent for Mrs. Powell . . ."

Mrs. Powell alleges in paragraph 11 of the
Amended Complaint (R 67) that defendant Sharp
failed to perform his duty to her (a) by failing
to notify her of the time and the place of the
closing, (b) by failure to examine and approve
(as required by his license) the closing statement,
and (c) by permitting unlawful charges against
Mrs. Powell's equity.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mrs. Powell urges this court to consider the
additional fact that the Department of Business
Regulation, Real Estate Division, Rules and
Regulations, published by the department, specifically require a real estate broker to attend a
closing and state:
"When sales are closed in title insurance
offices, lending institutions, and other
broker's offices, the broker or his
representative shall attend said closing,
approve all closing statements." [Emphasis
addec[J7
By his own sworn statement, Sharp failed to
fulfill the duty to review or even become aware
of the contents of the closing papers, as
specifically imposed upon him by regulatory law.
This court should, as a minimum, require defendant
Sharp to return the $1,230.00 real estate commission
he received directly from Prudential's loan officer
Radmall from Mrs. Powell's equity in her home.
Otherwise, real estate brokers in Utah are likely
in the future to disregard regulatory law and to
take their fees without even being aware that the
law imposes upon them any duty, or to wham the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
duty is owed.
SharpOCR,
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where the parties were equally knowledgeable
of their rights under the law and that his duty
was limited to bringing buyer and seller together.
This is a case where Mrs. Powell's funds paid
his fee and she, being absent from the closing,
was in desperate need of his professional
knowledge and protection.
IV
THE PRETRIAL DISMISSAL BY TOE TRIAL COURT
OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS $ LOAN
ASSOCIATION WAS ERROR AND SHOULD BE
REVERSED
It appears that the trial court accepted the
arguments of Prudential that it owed no fiduciary
duty to Mrs. Powell on the ground that Mrs. Powell
had no contact with Prudential prior to the real
estate closing. Prudential went further and argued
to the trial court that it had absolutely no duty
of any kind to Mrs. Powell, apparently not even
the T!prudent man M duty of ordinary care, despite
the fact that in the closing Prudential disbursed
$4,338.48 of Mrs. Powell's funds without her
knowledge or consent. At least part of those
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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disbursements were held by the trial court to have

been unlawful.
If the inconsistency of Prudential's asserting
absolutely no duty to the owner of property whose
funds it disbursed was insufficient to require
Prudential to stand trial, the other inconsistencies
in its pleadings should have been, e.g. the claim
made in Prudential's Answer that Bastian was the
"seller" of the property, but without any
explanation why, if Bastian was the seller, the
seller's costs were not charged to Bastian rather
than to an absent third party, Mrs. Powell.
Prudential repeatedly asserted in its pleadings
and Answer to Interrogatories that Prudential
received all of its information from Bastian which
resulted in damage to Mrs. Powell, but ridicules
the thought that Prudential was in any way a party
to a conspiracy against the interests of Mrs.
Powell.

Is conspiracy something other than two

people agreeing to a plan that is detrimental to
a third party?
Also, Prudential has made no answer to the
allegation contained in paragraph 13 of the Amended
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that Prudential's loan officer Radmall "forced11
a balance in his letter of March 24, 1972 (R 76)
by charging plaintiff Powell's account with $364.00
in addition to any figure shown on the official
seller's closing statement he had prepared on
September 10, 1970 (R 74).

Yet both the letter

and the seller's closing statement begin and end
with the same opening and closing figures.

It is

difficult to see how Prudential could claim no
responsibility for at least ordinary negligence
in "forcing11 these documents to balance.
It must also be remembered that Prudential's
loan officer Radmall understood that Mrs. Powell
had an "equity11 or ownership in the property.
Wouldn't the pursuit of just ordinary care require
him to have made inquiry of Mrs. Powell or to have
examined the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase and the option so that in pursuance of
ordinary care he could have made his own calculations
without collusion with Bastian and avoided damaging
Mrs. Powell?
Mrs. Powell argues that Prudential owed her a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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duty under the definition of "fiduciary" given
in a dictum by this court in Bradbury vs. Rassmussen,
16 U.2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965), which states that
a fiduciary relationship arises when one person
places confidence in another "under such circumstances as to create a corresponding duty, either
legal or moral, on the part of the other to
observe the confidence . . , and it must result
in a situation where as a matter of fact there is
superior influence on one side and dependence on
the other".

Such a situation is surely obtained

here.
However, if a standard of only ordinary care
was required of Prudential without privity with
Mrs. Powell to protect her from damage, it would
be no greater standard than that set by Title 12,
Sec. 1464, United States Code, governing federally
chartered savings and loan associations, which
states that federal charters should be issued only
to associations giving "primary consideration to
the best practices of local mutual thrift and
home lending institutions in the United States. "
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Such a standard of care would be similar to
that set in Milliner vs. Elmer Fox Co., 529 P.2d
806, decided by this court on December 10, 1974,
and may more accurately describe the standard of
care on which Mrs. Powell relies in making her
claim against Prudential.

In Milliner, the court

dealt specifically with the question of liability
of accountants to a third party for their negligence,
despite the absence of privity between the third
party and the accountants when the accountants had
reason to know that such party would rely on the
accountant's report for a particular purpose.
The opinion of this court goes on to state:
M

We are of the opinion that the lack of
privity is not a defense where an accountant
who is aware of the fact that his work will
be relied on by a party or parties who may
extend credit to his client or assume his
client's obiigations.ff
If an accountant is held responsible to third
parties without privity with those third parties,
should the law permit a large organization such
as Prudential to escape liability for negligent
damage it caused to Mrs. Powell, just because she
Digitized
Howard W. Hunter
Lawthe
Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School,
had by
notheprivity
with
institution?
ThisBYU.
question
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was also dealt with in Shatterproof Glass vs.
James, by the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, 466
SW.2d, page 73, 46 ALR 3rd 964, (1971) which case
was cited with approval by this court in Milliner,
supra.
In Shatterproof, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals adopted as the law in Texas, the definition
of the Restatement (2d) of Torts, Sec. 552, as
follows:
11

(1) One who, in the course of his business,
profession or employment, or in a transaction
in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others
in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the
information^1 [Emphasis added].
It would be completely reasonable for this
court to hold Prudential to the standard of the
restatement quoted above and adopted as law in
Texas.

The plaintiff in Shatterproof at least

had the option to decide whether or not to rely
on the accountant's opinion. Mrs. Powell had no
such option.

She was deprived of her property by
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her consent.

It was inconsistent with the facts

as revealed in the pleadings and law of this case
for the trial court to dismiss Prudential before
the plaintiff had an opportunity in open court to
ask Prudential's agents under oath to explain the
many inconsistencies raised by Prudential's pleadings
but explained by Prudential, only by alleging
repeatedly that it obtained all its information
from Bastian who obviously stood to gain if his
advice was followed. This was not the exercise of
reasonable care in obtaining itsinformation.
V
ALL PROCEEDS REALIZED BY DEFENDANT BASTIAN
FROM THE TRANSACTION CONSTITUTE INTEREST ON
MONEY ADVANCED AND NOT PROFIT, AND ALL SUCH
FINANCIAL REALIZATIONS IN EXCESS OF 81
ANNUALIZED CONSTITUTE ILLEGAL INTEREST
The only funds advanced by Bastian on which
he is entitled to receive interest is $8,703.35
he paid out on June 12, 1970, and on which he is
entitled to 81 interest for 90 days, or $171.68.
All other proceeds realized by Bastian from the
transaction in excess of the actual funds advanced
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59 ALR 2d 522 sets forth the legal theory on
which plaintiff sought relief in the trial and
on which appellant relies here. At 59 ALR 2d
526, the annotation states:
11

. . . a n action at common law in the
nature of an action for money had and
received will lie for the recovery back
of the usurious payments, at least where
the statute in relation to usury declares
a usurious contract void in whole or in
part. n
Since July 1, 1969 (approximately 9 months
before the beginning of the transaction here under
consideration), interest rates and penalties for
usuary have been set forth in Title 70B, U.C.A.,
The Utah Unifoim Consumer Credit Code (hereinafter
"UUCCC").

Therefore, whether Utah law "declares

usurious contracts void in whole or in part, n
must be determined by that statute.
Reference is made to "debtors remedies1f as
set forth in Section 70B-5-201, which in turn
makes reference to Section 70B-5-204, providing
that if a consumer loan involves an interest in
land, the borrower (Mrs. Powell) shall have three
^ a y s to rescind [void] the contract following
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act regarding, among other facts, the annual rate
of interest the lender is charging for the loan.
Defendant Bastian did not at the time of the
loan, and has never since the transaction, made
the required disclosures to Mrs. Powell. It is
at least arguable that she still has the right
to rescind.

If she does rescind, subsection (2)

of Section 70B-5-204 becomes effective and Mrs.
Powell could demand return to her of her home
plus interest and service charges made against
her.
Since such rescision would cause great damage
to the purchasers of her home who are presumed to
be entirely innocent of any wrongdoing, Mrs. Powell,
so far, has elected not to rescind, but rather to
seek damages she has suffered against those whose
actions caused her damage and who are knowledgeable
and responsible for her damages, viz., the defendants
herein.
Though the plaintiffs elected to bring this
action on common law and equitable theories as
exemplified by the 59 ALR 2d 526 annotation and
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might question whether the statutory remedies
set forth in Title 70B, the UUCCC are exclusive
so as to preclude any claim of usuary under common
law outside the perimeters of the statute. This
question seems to have been answered by the Legislature itself. One of several references to the
statute's non-exclusivity reads as follows:
"70B-1-103. Supplementary general principles
of law applicable. - Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this act, the Uniform
Commercial Code and the principles of law and
equity, including the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.11
Mrs. Powell contends that she retains her
common law right to recover usurious interest
and that the legal rate applicable to this transaction is 8% as established by the option, the
only instrument signed by the parties. Or if for
some reason the court feels the rate of 10% per
annum should be used, which rate was used by
the Legislature as the maximum interest rate
which, if not exceeded, appears to relieve a lender
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of money secured
by an
in land from some
Machine-generated
OCR,interest
may contain errors.

of the UUCCC sanctions other than the requirement
of disclosure. The change in calculations using
101 would not be difficult nor change the amount
of damage significantly.
The Section containing the 10% figure reads:
"70B-105. Definition - 'Loan primarily
secured by an interest in land/. Unless
the loan is made subj ect to this act by
agreement (Section 70B-3-601), and except
as provided with respect to disclosure
(Section 70B-3-301) and debtor's remedies
(Section 70B-5-201), 'consumer loan' does
not include a 'loan primarily secured by
an interest in land,' if at the time the
loan is made the value of this collateral
is substantial in relation to the amount
of the loan, and the loan finance charge
does not exceed ten per cent per year
calculated according to the actuarial method
of the unpaid balances of the principal on
the assumption that the debt will be paid
according to the agreed terms and will not
be paid before the end of the agreed term.
Nothing herein will prevent the acceleration
of payment without penalty. [Emphasis added].
On June 17, 1970, Bastian paid $3,055.34 cash
to Mrs. Powell (which she promptly used to pay
pressing debts and to improve her Orem home); $103.00
to Security Title and $5,545.01 to pay off second
mortgagee Lockhart. That was the total of $8,703.35
advanced, and is the total upon which Bastian is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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entitled to receive 8% legal interest for 90 days
until the sale was closed.

Interest amounts to

$1.90 per day or $171.68 for 90 days, which, if
added to the $8,703.35 advanced, totals $8,875.03
for cash advanced with permissible interest.
The figures of the transaction are summarized
below:
PROCEEDS DISBURSED BY PRUDENTIAL FROM
THE SALE

$20,570.00

Cash advanced by Bastian June 17, 1970,
on which 8% interest is due for 90 days:
Cash to Mrs. Powell
$3,055.43
To title insurance
103.00
2nd mortgage
5,545.01
Interest at 8% for 90 days
171.68
TOTAL ADVANCED BY BASTIAN AND INTEREST
DUE THEREON

8,875.03

Cash disbursed by Prudential to Mrs.
Powell or for her benefit:
Cash for her "equity"
$ 247.26
Judgments and tax liens
375.41
Retirement of Walker
mortgage
6,783.12
TOTAL DISBURSED BY PRUDENTIAL FOR MRS. POWELL
7,403.64
Combined disbursements by Bastian
and Prudential
Illegal interest "profit" and selling
costs charged to Mrs. Powell

16,278.67
4,291.33
$ 20,570.00
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The illegal interest, "profit11 and selling
costs in the amount of $4,291.33 shown above
constitute a substantial part of Mrs. Powell's
special damages.
Mrs. Powell also claims that Bastian took
credit for paying her $16,000.00 for the option
whereas the pay-off of Walker Bank's first
mortgage was $513.53 less than he took credit
for in accounting for the $16,000.00. Also,
following the court's ruling that no general
or special damages could be assessed, the court
by verbal order allowed Mrs. Powell to amend her
pleadings to include as an item of special damages,
$400.00 which her bankruptcy had cost for filing
fees and attorney's fees. And Mrs. Powell
calculates her damages in the following schedule
showing as offsets to her claimed damages, the
$171.00 lawful interest to which Bastian was
entitled and the $347.33 damages awarded Mrs.
Powell by the trial court.
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Total special damages claimed are:
Seller's costs assessed by
Prudential
$1,947.30
Claimed but unpaid by Bastian
to Mrs. Powell
513.53
Illegal interest claimed as
"profit"
2,000.00
Damages claimed in Amended
Complaint
$4,460.83
Bankruptcy filing and attorney's
fees
400.00
Total special damages
$4,860.83
Less 81 interest on $8,703.35
for 90 days due Bastian
Less damages awarded by trial
court
NET SPECIAL DAMAGES NOW CLAIMED
BY MRS. POWELL

171.68
$4,689.15
347.33-

$4,341.82

VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT GENERAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CANNOT BE ASSESSED IN
THIS CASE WAS ERRONEOUS AND THIS COURT
SHOULD NOW ASSESS SUCH DAMAGES AGAINST ALL
OR SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR DEGREE OF FAULT IN
CAUSING MRS. POWELL'S DAMAGES
It is Mrs. Powell's position that in the context
of this case and following the ideology set forth
in the annotation at 20 ALR 3d 666, the trial court
was free to allocate, and this court is now free
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to assess special, general and exemplary damages
in relation to the degree of fault each defendant
caused to the plaintiff.
That the foregoing is true in Utah seems
to have been spelled out by the Legislature when
it passed statutory provision for settlement by
joint tort-feasors, as follows:
n

78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor Determination of relative degrees of fault"""
oFJoint tort-feasors" - Joint tort-feasor
HeTified, . .
[2JlVhen there is a disproportion of fault
among joint tort-feasors to an extent that it
would render inequitable an equal distribution
by contribution among them of their common
liability, the relative degrees of fault of
the joint tort-feasors shall be considered in
determining their prorata shares, solely for
the purpose of determining their rights of
contribution among themselves, each remaining
severally liable to the injured person for
the whole injury as at common law."
Also, reference is made to plaintiff's Motion
for amendment of the pretrial Order, (R 87), which
cites the statement of Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger, made when he was still a member of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Washington,
D.C. Circuit, in Brown vs. Coats 253 F.2d 36, 67
ALR 2d 943 (1958), which is a case strikingly
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similar to this case on questions of law.

Circuit

Judge Burger, in justifying the imposition of
punitive damages said at page 950-51 in 67 ALR 2d:
"When one is commissioned by, or holds
himself out to, the community to perform
special services which may be engaged for
hire by others in the conduct of their
personal or business affairs, such as
lawyers, trust companies, realtors, or the
like, sudTpersons inescapably assume certain
fiduciary responsibilities. The community
in turn has a broad public interest, as a
matter of public policy, in how such persons
conduct their relations with those who place
trust in them . . . " [Emphasis added]
Mrs, Powell realizes damages cannot be charged
twice, and if this court requires Sharp to make
restitution of his commission, that amount must be
deducted from the special damages claimed against
Bastian. Mrs. Powell suffered great humiliation
and mental pain by being forced into bankruptcy, for
which she seeks $4,000.00 general damages. She also
asks $4,000.00 exemplary damages.

If these special,

general and exemplary damages are granted, it would
amount to about the "treble damages" Legislatures
commonly allow for usuary.
Mrs. Powell realizes that defendant Bastian
stood to gain the most from the improprieties of
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also the other defendants as well.

The outrageous -

ness of the entire transaction is such that some
of the general or exemplary damages should be
assessed against Prudential since in its position
of trust, Prudential cannot excuse itself from
the negligent damage it caused Mrs. Powell. The
matter of damages, of course, is left to the wise
and equitable discretion of this court.

CONCLUSION
This case arises in factual context where a
woman who worked as a retail clerk at low wages
with modest help from her foimer husband in the
form of child support, supported her two daughters
and one son, educating them, and for 17 years
keeping up the payments on her home. Finally,
family circumstances intervened over which she
had no control and she was forced to become
delinquent in her house payments and to borrow
against her equity from a second mortgage.

In

desperation she agreed to sell her house for a
fraction of its value to a party she sought out
for a byprovident
loan.
The J.buyer,
realizing
that
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the house had value much in excess of what he
paid, agreed to sell the house back to her for
a $2,000.00 quick profit if she could raise the
money he advanced plus $2,000,00 by selling it
to a third party within three months.
Once she had signed an Earnest Money Offer
presented by a licensed real estate broker, she
never heard anything about the transaction until
after the closing had been held at Prudential and
a check was issued to her for about 10% of the
amount she expected to receive from the transaction.
All of her equity and all of her bargaining power
had disappeared.

She didn't owe anyone anything

in the transaction from whom she could withhold
payments.

She was simply deprived of the equity

in her home she had built up over 17 years and
had almost nothing to show for it.
Since the days of the first English Chancellors,
courts have fashioned and employed equitable
remedies and at least in more recent years, courts
have expressed their moral indignation by assessing
exemplary damages against those responsible. The
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exemplary damages should be assessed to warn
others they act at their peril if they take too
lightly their responsibility to be fair to poor
and powerless parties whose funds they are
disbursing.
Respectfully submitted,
7
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Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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